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Abstract
The concepts of development and learning are discussed in terms of different theoretical orientations
to the study of motor behavior. It is argued that although these concepts are commonly used to discuss
various aspects of change across the life span, there is little agreement regarding the definition of these
terms and even whether these are useful concepts for researchers studying change over time. A theoretical
approach, the TASC-based approach is presented as an alternative account for examining change over
time. The TASC label stands for a focus on particulartasks, adaptationandselectionof behaviors as a
function ofconstraints. This account is grounded in evolutionary theory and assumes that variability,
selection, and adaptation are central to change over time within individuals. Emphasis is placed on
the tasks individuals attempt to solve in achieving particular goals given the constraints of the local
environment and the organism. An alternative manner to conceptualize the concepts of development and
learning are presented within the TASC-based approach.
© 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Department and learning: a TASC-based perspective
Researchers have used the terms “development” and “learning” in a variety of ways with
the importance of viewing these concepts as separate and distinct varying as a function of
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the dominant theories of the time (seePick, 2003). These two terms are used extensively by
researchers in discussion of research findings, seemingly based on the underlying assumptions
that: (a) there is wide-spread agreement on what these terms mean, (b) that these terms capture
different underlying processes, and (c) that changes over time are more likely the result of one
or the other of these two “distinct” processes. We suggest, however, that these assumptions
are not valid and that we need to reconsider how the terms “development” and “learning” are
conceptualized.
To some extent problems with defining “learning” and “development” may be attributed to
the fact that no single theory dominates the study of human behavior and how behavior changes
over the life span. There is no grand unifying theory (GUT) that serves to guide research and
practice in this discipline. One outcome of this lack of unity is that different researchers and
theorists use and define these terms within the contexts of their own particular theoretical
orientation, with little agreement in how these terms should be defined across theoretical
perspectives. Not surprisingly, one outcome of these disparate views is that researchers from
different theoretical orientations provide greater or lesser emphasis to concepts of development
and learning within their explanatory accounts. We begin by briefly outlining some distinctions
that have been drawn regarding the concepts of development and learning, acknowledging that
an exhaustive account of these distinctions is well beyond the scope of this paper. We use these
distinctions to highlight differences in theoretical accounts and suggest that perhaps the only
way to clarify these two concepts is by the construction of a more unified account of how
human behavior changes over time and we make some preliminary suggestions about what
that account might include.
In order to clarify the theoretical underpinnings of the various definitions of development
and learning, we take two quite different theoretical views to serve as an initial backdrop for
our discussion. Specifically, we contrast maturational accounts and an information processing
perspective of changes in human behavior over time. We choose these two perspectives because
their differences in underlying assumptions and foci enables us to examine the concepts of
development and learning from two relatively extreme positions. Other theoretical accounts
provide somewhat of a middle ground between these positions.
Advocates of the maturational perspective often suggest that their focus is on “development.”
From this perspective, development is typically defined as a change brought about by matu-
ration and endogenous influences. These “developmental” changes are often characterized as
involving a broad level of change that permeates the system (domain general), occurs over a
long time scale (many years), and results in lasting change in the organism. In contrast, ad-
vocates of the information processing perspective often suggest that they focus on “learning,”
defined as a change in behavior brought about by experience and exogenous influences. These
changes are often thought as relatively narrow in scope, not thought to generalize except to
similar behaviors or situations (domain specific), thought to generally occur over a short time
scale (often a single session), and are thought to sometimes, but not always result in a relatively
permanent change in the organism.
Given these distinctions, it is not at all that surprising that researchers focusing on
“development” often study infants and very young children assuming that this is the best
time to capture change in behavior unsullied by exogenous influences, and researchers fo-
cusing on “learning” often study older children and adults assuming that “developmental”
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processes will no longer complicate the “learning” process. Clear example of this split can
be seen with respect to the acquisition of perceptual-motor skills. Motor “developmentalists”
traditionally have been aligned with maturational approaches. Indeed, the entire field of “motor
development” has as its organizational theme the understanding of “development” as opposed
to “learning.” Researchers and theorists from this traditional perspective (e.g.,Gesell, 1929,
1933; Halverson, 1931; McGraw, 1943; see for an overview:Pick, 2003) viewed children and
adults as qualitatively different from one another with much of the difference being driven
by the maturation of distinct structures in the central nervous system. From this perspective,
development and maturation are often treated as synonymous, except that development is typ-
ically reserved for those behavioral changes that occur toward the beginning of the life span,
especially those occurring in infancy and early childhood, and maturation is applied more
broadly across the life span.
Many of the early motor developmentalists focused on the emergence of particular behav-
iors, such as sitting, grasping, walking and running. These fundamental movement patterns
have been labeled as “phylogenetic” behaviors (McGraw, 1935/1975; Newell, 1986). Phyloge-
netic behaviors and changes in these behaviors over time were thought to be relatively uniform
across individuals in terms of timing and order. Change was described as qualitative in nature
and driven by underlying maturational processes. In contrast, “ontogenetic” behaviors were
defined as behaviors that were not viewed as fundamental for survival and were more idiosyn-
cratic to individuals. It is these ontogenetic behaviors that were left to the researchers interested
in “learning.”
For the most part, researchers investigating motor “learning” have been interested in the
processes that lead to changes in the behavior of older children and adults, when the human
organism has mostly matured. From the motor “learning” view, the actual behavior under
scrutiny has traditionally been thought of as less important than understanding the underlying
process of behavioral change. In this manner no particular behavior is viewed as more central
than another based on the assumption that similar processes govern the acquisition across
different behaviors and tasks. Researchers from this perspective also tend to view children and
adults on a continuum, with children viewed as less efficient learners than adults.
None of the aforementioned distinctions are all that satisfying. This dissatisfaction stems
from a general difficulty in the application of these terms to real examples. Do children “learn”
to crawl or walk? Or does the ability to locomote “develop”? Do children “learn” to grasp
writing implements? Or do children’s grip configurations “develop”? Do throwing and catching
“develop”? Or are throwing and catching skills “learned” (Roberton, 1984)? These examples
highlight the “fuzziness” of these concepts and the theoretical baggage that come with their use.
One might in fact question whether there is any advantage in using the terms “development”
and “learning” at all. Indeed, it may very well turn out that these terms fail to capture any useful
distinction at all. If this is true, then it is perhaps time to “retire” these terms and potentially
create some new term or terms for capturing change over the life span. This may be the best
approach, however, it might be fruitful to examine these terms once more, but with the goal of
determining whether a more clear distinction can be made between them.
Our goal in the present paper is not to provide a comprehensive review of the diverse
perspectives on learning and development (seePick, 2003for a historical perspective on these
terms), but mainly to provide some thoughts on how we might resolve some of the definitional
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ambiguity of these two terms and whether it is actually meaningful and useful to treat these
terms as distinct and mapping onto to distinct processes. With this latter goal in mind, we
suggest some potential ways in which it might be useful to investigate whether the terms
“learning” and “development” map onto different processes. We begin by addressing some
issues with the traditional motor milestone approach and then provide a brief discussion of
dynamic systems approaches prior to describing our approach.
1.1. Perceptual-motor milestones
Much of research examining the acquisition of motor behaviors in infancy and childhood has
focused on the “development” of action systems. These action systems include such complex
behaviors as walking (Thelen & Cooke, 1987; Thelen & Ulrich, 1991), reaching (Savelsbergh,
Von Hofsten, & Jonsson, 1997; Thelen & Smith, 1994), and grasping (Newell, Scully, Ten-
nebaum, & Hardiman, 1989;Van Hof, Van der Kamp, & Savelsbergh, 2002). The focus in
motor development research has traditionally been on trying to understand the “process of
development,” with emphasis on careful description of the emergence of a particular behavior.1
These careful descriptions were often quite elaborate consisting of many “developmental”
stages with particular behaviors viewed as “maturing” at particular ages in young children
(Gesell, 1929; McGraw, 1943). For the most part, the behaviors of focus were classified as
“phylogenetic” and fundamental to the survival of the species. These age-based descriptions
lead to the creation of “motor milestones” that can be found in any developmental textbook (see
Thelen & Adolph, 1992, for a discussion of Gesell’s role in the creation of these milestones).
Von Hofsten (1993)has suggested that “age norms are important for helping us to form expecta-
tions about age-specific performance” (p. 110), but the focus on age norms can be problematic.
The focus on age-specific changes implies that the emergence of the motor milestones is
driven by maturational changes common to all members of the species. Description of motor
milestones as relatively stable and predictable has served to reinforce this assumption. Indeed,
the whole idea that performance might be age specific assumes a level of consistency across
children; one that it is hard to imagine could be accounted for by anything other than a similar
maturational process driving change in all children. We argue that this traditional perspective
has treated “development” as equivalent to maturation, which makes the reification of age-based
norms seem reasonable. In our view they are not. Rather one of the central arguments of our
approach is that we need to move away from age-based norms and their implicit maturational
assumptions.
Von Hofsten (1993)has suggested a number of additional limitations in using age norms.
First, norms are highly dependent on the population that provides the norming sample. Even a
cursory examination of the motor development literature and of the “norming” samples used in
many standardized tests suggest that these norms are most applicable to infants and children of
predominantly white, middle-class families in the United States. AsThelen and Adolph (1992)
discuss, Gesell used highly restrictive sampling in the creation of his developmental norms and
more alarmingly these norms still serve as the basis for a number of standard assessment tools.
Restrictive norming samples severely limit the usefulness of an assessment tool for children
who vary from the norm because these are by definition likely to be outside the “norm” and
thus look “delayed” in some aspect of behavior.
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A second limitation cited byVon Hofsten (1993)stems from the fact that norms are de-
rived by pooling data for groups of individuals. This process leads to an overall smoothing
of the data and serves to hide any fluctuations or discontinuities that exist, making the ac-
quisition of a behavior look incremental and continuous. A related limitation of age norms is
that they serve to “hide the great natural variation in motor development between individuals”
(Von Hofsten, 1993, p. 110). This notion of inherent variability is a central theme of our
approach.
Reliance on age norms can also obscure the underlying cause of variation (Von Hofsten,
1993). That is, one cannot determine whether variation from the norm is due to normal variation
or to some sort of pathology. We suggest that the use of age norms in clinical practice leads to
the assumption that variation is deviant and that the deviation stems from an underlying pathol-
ogy. For example, children who score below the 5th centile in tests of motor behavior, such
as the Movement Assessment Battery for Children (Movement ABC;Henderson & Sugden,
1992), are classified as having Developmental Coordination Disorder (DCD, also referred to
as Developmental Dyspraxia or Clumisiness). Although this “disorder” is recognized as such
by clinicians, and can be found in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-I;American
Psychiatric Association, 1994), little evidence exists to suggest that this “disorder” reflects
any underlying pathology. Indeed, the standard definition of this disorder is “a coordina-
tion disorder resulting from developmental delays in motor skills,not due to another med-
ical or neurological condition.” We suggest that if motor behavior is normally distri-
buted, scores in the bottom 5% may reflect normal variation rather than some underlying
pathology.2
The problem of determining what is and what is not pathological has important implications
for therapeutic interventions. Specifically, if deviations from motor milestones are viewed as
pathological, stemming from some “maturational” problem rather than caused by “normal”
variation around a particular level, different types of interventions may be proposed. Specif-
ically, genetic techniques, medicinal approaches, and interventions that attempt to “correct”
global functioning may be favored to treat “maturational” problems. If, however, deviation
is thought of as a “typical” rather than “pathological,” practice and experience targeted to
“correct” specific problems might be offered to attempt to bring performance up to the norm.
Not surprisingly most therapeutic approaches in the field of motor development appear to be
based on underlying maturational models and the overall success at improving the quality
of movement in young children has been quite mixed. In contrast, task-specific interventions
focusing on helping children accomplish specific goals appear to have some promise (Park r
& Larkin, 2003).
An additional problem with a focus on age-based norms is that this focus often leads to the
study of behavior in relative isolation. That is, researchers who have studied the acquisition of
locomotor skills, the acquisition of grasping, the acquisition of throwing, etc. have tradition-
ally not attempted to understand the contextual factors that influence the emergence of these
behaviors. Specifically, researchers have not been concerned with how these actions fit with
thespecific goal that the child is attempting to achieve. Foo and Kelso (2001)have suggested
that the individual’s goal serves to provide meaning to the sources of information present in
the environment. This goal also serves to determine in a dynamic way how different sources of
information are used and the relative importance of the information present. By divorcing the
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process from the goal, the action systems have become disembodied from the living, thinking,
goal-oriented child.
Although the major milestones of the various action systems (reaching, walking, etc.)
may show a relatively uniform sequence across children in terms of their emergence and
be relatively similar across children in their behavioral instantiation, we suggest that it is
perhaps time to call into question the very idea of motor milestones. The primary reason
for questioning the existence of motor milestones lies in the fact that the data that serve as
the basis for these milestones was collected within the context of maturational theories that
assumed that “development” was stable and uniform across children. It is clear that theo-
retical orientations influence the research questions asked, the methodologies used to col-
lect data, and the manner in which the data is interpreted (Overton, 1998). It is
somewhat surprising to us that given the widespread criticism of maturational accounts that
there has been little or no questioning of the validity of motor milestones. Many researchers
have distanced themselves from maturational accounts by suggesting the milestones are
“age-related” rather than “age-based” (Clark & Metcalfe, 2002). The problem with this ap-
proach is that the “stability” of motor milestones is relatively well-entrenched in the larger
culture—and a more radical departure from these norms may be necessary for real changes
to occur in the way change over time is conceptualized (by both researchers and non-
researchers).
Additionally, if we question the assumption of the dominant role of maturation in leading to
changes over the life span, then it may be necessary to question both the data and the conclu-
sions drawn from the data that were collected under that assumption. That is, we suggest that it
may be time to re-examine the stability of developmental sequences along with the consistency
of motor milestones.
We suggest that emergence of various behaviors across the life span is not fixed by age,
but arises from an interaction of constraints as a child tries to solve a particular problem. That
is, the emergence of various motor behaviors needs to be examined in the context of the task
that the child is trying to solve. The emergence of certain motor behaviors, such as the onset
of walking, are likely to be relatively uniform (in terms of the sequence of their emergence
and overall form) because they haveevolvedas optimal solutions to particular problems that
threaten a child’s survival at particular periods of his or her life. They are also likely to show
relative uniformity because they emerge due to a highly similar configuration of interacting
constraints when different children are attempting to achieve the same or similar overall goals.
It is the uniformity of constraints, not age that lead to similarity in overt behaviors across
children.
With respect to other motor behaviors, such as the emergence of belly crawling or a dynamic
tripod grasp with respect to writing, we see these behaviors as less necessary for survival and
less likely to be determined by a specific set of interacting constraints that are similar across chil-
dren. Our prediction is that these behaviors will not likely show the same degree of uniformity
in appearance (not all children will exhibit these specific behaviors) or form (the specific man-
ner in which these behaviors are achieved may vary greatly from child to child) that is found for
those behaviors that are fundamental for survival. In these cases no single optimal solution may
emerge, but a number of different behavioral solutions may have a relatively high probability of
emerging.
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1.2. Dynamic systems approaches
Periodically, there is renewed desire for a unified theory of development.L wis (2000)has
argued that a “vital goal for the next generation of developmental theorizing” is to formulate a
“converging explanatory framework” (p. 36). In his view, this has already been accomplished by
dynamic systems approaches. He suggests that the concept of self-organization, specifically, the
concept that stable patterns (order) emerges from the spontaneous interaction of components
in physical, chemical, and biological systems, provides the single explanation for any and
all developmental change. Likewise,Horowitz (2000)has claimed that there is a growing
consensus that human development is a complex, multi-causal process. This view is clearly
supported by others taking a dynamic systems perspective (Smith & Thelen, 1993).
Thelen and Smith (1994)have suggested that the dichotomy of development and learning is
not a meaningful one from a dynamic systems view because both of these processes occur all the
time and it is impossible to tease apart when one of these processes occurs without the other. That
is, the acquisition of any new form of behavior is a dynamic one involving the self-organization
of many different components of the system. Some of these components may change as a
function of “developmental” processes, while others may change as a function of “learning.”
Because no resultant behavior is “hardwired,” all behaviors are viewed as stemming from this
complex self-organization process, and all behaviors might then be viewed as dependent upon
both “learning” and “development.” In many ways this perspective might lead one to conclude
that the concepts of “learning” and “development” are no longer of much use.
Should we dispense with these terms? Do they provide any meaningful distinction regarding
the acquisition of particular perceptual-motor behaviors? One way to evaluate this is to examine
whether dynamic systems accounts and the concept of self-organization can provide a unifying
theoretical account of development. To the extent that they do, it suggests that we really should
consider dispensing with the concepts of “development” and “learning” and perhaps label all
change as due to “self-organization.”
In our view, research from this theoretical perspective has made substantial contributions
to the field of motor development (Thelen & Ulrich, 1991) and language development (Van
Geert, 1991, 1993) but has yet failed to make serious inroads into other aspects of develop-
mental research and theorizing. Although one could argue that this stems from problems with
researchers understanding the theory (Lewis, 2000), we suggest that the problem is deeper.
Specifically we suggest that while dynamic systems approaches can be quite helpful for aiding
our understanding of certain types of behavioral change, we suggest that the theory is unlikely
to become (at least in its present manifestations) the GUT of development. We suggest that
current dynamic systems accounts have two major limitations.
The first limitation concerns the problem that no particular behaviors appear to be privi-
leged in dynamic systems accounts. Researchers from a dynamic systems perspective have
examined a variety of rhythmic behaviors such as stepping (Thelen & Ulrich, 1991), infant
bouncing (Goldfield, Kay, & Warren, 1993), and various combinations of limb movements
(e.g.,Amazeen, Amazeen, & Turvey, 1998; Kelso & Jeka, 1992). The emergence and overall
organization of these behaviors is viewed quite similarly, with all being described in terms
of self-organization of certain behavioral states. Likewise there is no privileged reason for
preferring to study one or another of these behaviors because the same underlying principles
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of self-organization are thought to apply equally well for any and all behavior. We suggest
that some behaviors are in fact privileged and should perhaps be viewed as emerging from
a different set of constraints than others. In particular, we suggest that the course of human
evolution has served to “privilege” some behaviors over others and that the behaviors that are
privileged shift as a function of changing task, organismic, and environmental constraints. We
will explain our perspective on this in greater detail in a later section.
The second limitation of dynamic systems accounts is they that they fail to address why
a particular behavior emerges at a given point. In our view, this why question is central and
must be addressed by any theoretical account of the acquisition of motor behaviors in infancy
and beyond. Self-organization does describe a potential process underlying the emergence of a
behavior but it does not provide an explanation for why a behavior might emerge. We suggest
that one potential way of addressing the why question is to examine the emergence of behavior
from an evolutionary perspective. Ethologists have often phrased this why question in terms
of the function of particular behaviors, with specific attention given to how a behavior relates
to survival value and the investigation of the elements in an immediate situation that impact
on the expression of a particular behavior (e.g.,Tinbergen, 1960). This functional assessment
of behavior is lacking in current dynamic systems accounts.
In our view, the issues of behavioral function, survival value, and individual goals separate
the human complex system from other complex systems such as weather systems. Indeed, if the
function of a behavior is considered from an evolutionary perspective, seeming errors, such
as the A-not-B error, can be viewed as perhaps functionally correct in some environmental
contexts (Hailman, 2001). Specifically, Hailman argues that producing the A-not-B behavior
is quite adaptive in terms of foraging for food. He provides the example of bird attempting to
eat some ants. For example, an ant emerges from a hole (location A), and then disappears back
into the hole. Another ant emerges and does the same thing. Soon after another ant emerges
and hides behind a nearby leaf (location B). Where should the bird that has been observing this
process look for its next meal? Although searching behind the leaf may provide a tasty morsel,
searching at the hole is likely to be more fulfilling in the long run. By examining the how and
why of the behavior in contexts where it might occur, the behavior is rendered more meaningful.
1.3. The TASC-based approach to changes in perceptual-motor behavior
In response to problems we perceive with past and present theoretical accounts of the changes
occurring in perceptual-motor behaviors across the life span, we have been constructing the
TASC-based approach. The TASC label stands for a focus on particulartasks,adaptationandse-
lectionof behaviors as a function ofconstraints. We suggest that the TASC-based account might
provide a useful structure in which to consider possible differences between “development”
and “learning.” We present this approach, not as a GUT, but to suggest some essential building
blocks necessary for any unified approach to examining changes in behavior over time.
1.4. The role of variability
Our approach is focused on functional tasks rather than on chronological age. In part,
we propose this approach as a way of coping with the fact that change within an organism
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over the course of its life span is characterized more by variability than stability. Indeed,
we suggest asSiegler (1994, 1996)and Thelen and Smith (1994)have, that variability is
an essential characteristic of human behavior.Siegler (1994), for example, argues that vari-
ability plays a crucial role in driving changes in children’s cognition. With respect to in-
fancy, a growing number of researchers have begun to believe that variability in early in-
fant movements is an essential aspect of normal motor development (Thelen, 1996; Touwen,
1990; Turvey & Fitzpatrick, 1993) and a fundamental aspect of all complex systems (Thelen
& Smith, 1994). Indeed, research investigating a variety of biological systems, including
investigations of human postural control (Newell, van Emmerik, Lee, & Sprague, 1993),
and studies of human physiological systems (Goldberger, Rigney, & West, 1990), suggest
that healthy biological systems are exhibit a greater level of variability (i.e., they are more
chaotic) than diseased ones. In the realm of motor behavior, for example,Prechtl (1997)
has found that infants who exhibit limited variability in their movements in the first few
months of life are more likely to develop abnormalities in motor development, such as Cerebral
Palsy.
The recognition that variability is an essential aspect of the human biological system requires
a major shift in the focus of developmental studies. Traditionally, the only form of variability
of interest to developmental researchers was variability due to age. But asSiegler (1996)has
pointed out variability is also present within individuals performing the same task repeatedly
and between individuals of the same age. In our view, we need to move away from a focus on
age-based or even age-related milestones. Rather the focus should be on why and how children
solve particular tasks that they are confronted with at different points in the life span. In order
to answer these why and how questions we need to understand the function of behaviors in the
context where they occur.
Some of the core ideas of the TASC-based approach, namely the importance of con-
straints, selection pressures, and variability, can be illustrated by changes over time of the
mosquito populations in the London Underground.Byrne (1999)found that over time the
population living in the underground became distinct from the population that lives above
the ground. For instance, the above population bites birds and has a winter diapause, while
the underground population bites mammals and has no winter diapause. These adaptations
to the new Underground environment are a result of survival pressures. The evolution of the
‘underground mosquito’ came about due to selection of certain behaviors due to changes
in the environmental constraints. Specifically, birds were unavailable as a source of food
and temperatures in the Underground tend to be higher on average than those on the sur-
face. These changes in environmental constraints (temperature and availability of food) led
to adaptations of the ‘above mosquito.’ If the mosquito population had not exhibited
some variation in basic behaviors (i.e., a taste for alternative food sources), the mosquito
population underground would have died off. Instead, they adapted to the changes in en-
vironmental constraints and continue to flourish (much to the chagrin of Underground
travelers!).
The point of this example is that any theoretical account of the emergence of some be-
havior (a “developmental” theory) must acknowledge that behavior emerges in response to
a particular problem of adaptation (defined here as a “task”). Variation in the set of possi-
ble behaviors enables the organism (at the species and individual level) to select different
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behaviors to adapt to changing constraints. Variability provides the avenue for successful
adaptation. An intrinsic goal of biological organisms is the solution of various tasks that they
are confronted with over the course of their life span, in particular those tasks that threaten
survival. We expect that a relatively small set of optimal solutions have emerged over the
course of human evolution to solve problems that threaten survival within the typical en-
vironmental constraints found on Earth. We return to this issue of optimization in a latter
section. As children grow and mature the particular tasks they are confronted with change as
well.
Part of the goal of any explanation of the emergence of new human behaviors should be
the articulation of specific tasks that must be solved over the course of an individual’s life and
an explanation of the importance of a particular task at a particular point in the life span. In
our view, the central aspect of any “developmental” theory should be a focus on behaviors
that have evolved as solutions to problems associated with functional tasks (those that must
be solved in order for an individual to survive). This approach enables us to move beyond
purely descriptive accounts to explainwhy, how, and even perhapswhena certain behavior
emerges.
Our approach takes at its core, evolutionary theory, and particularly the concepts of adap-
tation, variation, and selection. Although other theories in developmental psychology have
drawn from evolutionary theory, these tend to only apply evolutionary theory in a limited
fashion while primarily borrowing metaphors from other disciplines (e.g., dynamic systems
theory) or restrict the scope of behaviors that they address to a relatively small set of behaviors
(e.g., attachment theory). We see our view, while sharing certain evolutionary assumptions, as
distinct from traditional evolutionary biological explanations of behavior (Geary & Bjorklund,
2000). Specifically, the goals of evolutionary developmental psychology have been to “identify
the social, psychological, cognitive, and neural phenotypes that are common to human beings,
and to other species, and to identify the genetic and ecological mechanisms that shape the
development of these phenotypes and ensure their adaptation to local conditions” (Geary &
Bjorklund, 2000, p. 56).
We share with this theoretical perspective a focus on the function of behavior. For ex-
ample,Byrne (1995)has suggested that an extended period of maturation is related to the
greater and more sophisticated use of tools in some species and that tool use serves the
function of facilitating later food gathering. We suggest that we should always be asking
“what is the function of this behavior?” both in the current situation and over the course
of evolution. Focusing on function leads us to prioritize certain behaviors over others, and
to search for functional linkages between different behaviors, as we attempt to understand
how change occurs over the life span. A focus on function also provides a potentially richer
description of behaviors at particular points in the life span. For example, aspects of imma-
ture perceptual and cognitive abilities are often viewed as simply that. However, from an
evolutionary perspectiveTurkewitz and Kenny (1982)have suggested that immaturity in the
infant visual system might serve a protective function preventing over-stimulation. We suggest
these early limitations of the infant visual system might also enable the infant to better focus
his or her attention to particularly important aspects of the visual environment, such as the
face of a caregiver, and in this manner gradually acquire visual information in manageable
amounts from what would otherwise be overwhelming amount of visual information. In a
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Fig. 1. The TASC model.
similar vein,Bjorklund (1997)has suggested that an immature cognitive system, with a lim-
ited auditory memory span may function to reduce the amount and complexity of language
that young children process and in this manner enhance comprehension as children acquire
language.
The TASC-based approach differs from evolutionary developmental psychology in a num-
ber of ways. We capture this difference in part inF g. 1. In our view, researchers in evolutionary
developmental psychology tend to focus at the species level shown at the bottom of the figure
and strive to create explanations for behavior at this macro level of analysis. In contrast, we are
primarily interested in the three levels depicted above the species level; the individual, the task,
and behavioral levels. While the evolutionary level provides the overall structural framework
for the processes that occur above it, we suggest that it is at the three higher levels where de-
velopment and learning take place. To a large degree our differences lie in the level of analysis.
We are more interested in the micro level, while evolutionary developmental psychologists are
more interested in the macro level of analysis. Our emphasis on the top three levels ofFig. 1
also represents a lesser focus on genetic factors contributing to individual differences than re-
searchers emphasizing the bottom level. In our view, the field of perceptual-motor development
has traditionally placed too great an emphasis on genetic and maturational explanations and
that these tend to lead to a focus on commonalties rather than variation. Genetic contributions
and rates of maturation in our approach serve as organismic constraints that always interact
with task and environmental constraints as well as other organismic constraints, including the
goal of the individual in the ongoing task situation.
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2. General principles of the TASC approach
2.1. Task focus
Because of the inherent variability both within and across developing organisms of the same
species, we propose that a task-based, rather than age-based description of how behaviors are
acquired over the life span will best enable us to examine the underlying processes that lead
to change. Focusing on age-related changes over the course of an organism’s life obscures
variability that is inherent throughout the life span and implicitly leads to the inference that
changes are driven primarily by maturational processes that are innately driven. An age focus
also ignores the inherent dynamic between organism and environment and the inherent dynamic
within the changing organism. Behavioral change does not emerge purely from an individual,
but emerges from the interaction of the organism and environment as the organism struggles
to adapt and solve particular problems.
What do we mean by “tasks”? We use the term “task” to refer to particular problems the
child faces over the course of his or her life. Some of these tasks present fundamental problems
to the child that he or she must solve in order to survive. Young infants face a number of
fundamental problems that they must figure out how to solve. These include figuring out how
to work one’s body so as to acquire food, escape from danger, or explore the surroundings.
Other tasks are less essential for survival but may be important for success (here defined as
optimal performance) in a variety of different domains (e.g., family, school).
The tasks specified in this approach are not arbitrary, but defined by problems the developing
organism is confronted with over its’ life. We label particular tasks that are necessary for survival
“Developmental Tasks.” It is the solution to these tasks and the processes of adaptation to
environmental pressures that lead to the selection of certain behaviors that serve as solutions to
these tasks that a “developmental” theory should be built on. In this manner, certain behaviors
have “priority” over others and it is these behaviors that “developmental” theories should strive
to explain.
In the early parts of life, these “developmental tasks” may follow a fairly uniform chronology
(though one that is only loosely coupled with age). In this sense, we do not wish to do away
with any type of reference to age, we merely want to de-emphasize the importance of age
in developmental accounts. Thus, our claim is that our focus should be on the problems (or
tasks) that children confront over the course of their lives. Within this framework, examining
variation in the age at which most children solve a particular problem or acquire a particular
behavior is important information, but only to the extent that it sheds light on how organismic
contraints interact with environmental ones as a child tries to solve a particular problem.
2.2. Development and learning
Returning to our discussion of development and learning, we propose that the term “deve-
lopment” be reserved for those changes associated with solving “developmental tasks,” those
tasks which all children must solve in order to survive. The term “learning” could then be
used to describe changes associated with “non-developmental tasks,” those tasks that a child
does not need to solve in order to survive. But how exactly should one decide whether a task
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should be characterized as a developmental or non-developmental one? Most developmentalists
would agree that behaviors involved in eating, and avoiding danger have clear survival value.
More specifically, behaviors such as chewing, grasping, crawling and walking would seem to
be clear examples of solutions to the developmental tasks of eating and avoiding dangerous
situations. Likewise, behaviors such as riding a unicycle or finger tapping have less clear gen-
erality and should be characterized as non-developmental tasks. In many ways our distinction
of development and learning parallels the traditional dichotomy in the field of motor develop-
ment of phylogenetic and ontogenetic change (N well, 1986; Roberton, 1984). Traditionally,
phylogenetic change was viewed as change occurring in all members of the species and so
would be associated with what we describe as developmental change. In contrast, ontogenetic
change was viewed as those changes idiosyncratic to the individual and so would be associ-
ated with what we describe as learning. We reject the phylogenetic/ontogenetic distinction on
two counts. First, these terms have traditionally been associated with a maturational account
motor development. This account carries a lot of theoretical baggage and is not an effective ac-
count of changes that occur over the life span. Second, the traditional phylogenetic/ontogenetic
distinction places phylogenetic (developmental) change at the species level of the hierarchy
depicted inFig. 1and ontogenetic change at the top two levels. We suggest that development
and learning occur throughout the top three levels of the hierarchy depicted inFig. 1and that
these should be distinguished from evolutionary change that occurs at the species level (the
bottom ofFig. 1).
An additional criterium for determining whether the acquisition of a particular behavior
should be attributed to development or learning is whether the behavior exhibits clear levels of
expertise. For those behaviors that emerge due to development, we should expect relative (but
not complete!) uniformity in expression and less clear levels of expertise as a result of very
similar organismic, environmental, and task constraints over the course of evolution. Although
there is clearly some variation in how people walk and sit, it is difficult to conceptualize truly
“expert” levels of walking or sitting. Due to evolutionary pressures sitting and walking are
practiced constantly throughout life and all relatively healthy individuals achieve the same
overall level of function.
Even though one can think of certain individuals as achieving a level of expertise in walking,
as in the case of tight-rope walkers, this expert level of behavior appears to result from “learning”
added onto the basics acquired through development. Thus, if there are clear levels of exper-
tise observed in a particular behavior, we suggest that “learning” rather than “development”
accounts for the advances beyond the behavioral norm. Other forms of motor behavior, such
as juggling and even drawing, show clear expert levels of performance, and in our view can be
clearly viewed as the result of learning rather than development.
2.3. Adaptive value of variation
Another central assumption of our approach is that variability is inherent to biological
systems and that in living, acting, biological organisms this variability serves an adaptive
function. On any given task, or analysis of a particular behavior, variability, rather than stability
is the norm. That is, if one looks closely at any behavior, performance is highly variable. It
is highly variable between children of the same age, in a child over successive observations,
486 K.S. Rosengren et al. / Infant Behavior & Development 26 (2003) 473–494
and even in a child within the same period of observation (Siegler, 1996, 2000). At present, no
developmental theory adequately captures the importance of this variability, although a growing
number of developmental researchers are beginning to embrace aspects of variability in their
work (Arterberry & Bornstein, 2002; Bornstein, 2002; De Weerth & Van Geert, 2002; Gilmore
& Thomas, 2002; Hadders-Algra, 2002; Oakes & Plumert, 2002; Piek, 2002; Rosengren, 2002;
Siegler, 1996, 2000, 2002; Snyder, Webb, & Nelson, 2002; Thelen & Smith, 1994; Van Geert
& Van Dijk, 2002; Yonas, Elieff, & Arterberry, 2002). We argue that the failure to examine
issues of variability may be attributed to a number of factors, including entrenched underlying
theoretical assumptions (including ones about age-related changes), equating variability with
noise (either in the data or due to the measurement instruments), and the research methodology
(both design and statistics) used to evaluate children and how they acquire behaviors over the
course of their lives (Rosengren & Braswell, 2001). Past theories of development, in our view
fail, because they have failed to acknowledge and account for these different types of variability.
Variability stems, in our view, from basic evolutionary pressures that enable both the indi-
vidual organism and the species overall to adapt to their local environment in order to survive.
In early life this adaptation process increases the likelihood of survival. In later life, this vari-
ability is less necessary for survival, but instead enables greater flexibility in behavior, and
greater efficiency in acquiring new skills and behaviors.
2.4. Constraints
Constraints enable behavioral change to occur. Constraints, both within the organism, and
within the context of the organism–environment fit serve to both limit and enable the emergence
of particular behaviors at any given period of time in the life span. Constraints operate at
three levels: task, organism, and environmental (Newell, 1986). Without these constraints, the
developing organism would be faced with an overwhelming amount of information. For the very
young infant the constraints enable the infant to pick up information that is relevant for survival.
In a sense, these initial constraints involve a “pre-selection” of information (this pre-selection
is due to evolutionary pressures). For example, imagine if all the perceptual systems of the
infant were equally developed at birth. This would mean that the infant is virtually bombarded
with information from the visual system, auditory system, olfactory system, etc. However, the
perceptual systems mature at different rates. For example, the visual system, which is arguable
the most sensitive and picks-up the most information, is relatively immature at birth (Geary
& Bjorkland, p. 59). We argue, that this serves to constrain the information that the infant can
attend too initially. If this system, were fully functionally at birth, the richness of information
that an infant picks up could very well overwhelm the system so that the infant would never
learn to attend to other sources of information, such as the auditory or tactile ones. Thus, the
differential time course of development of the perceptual systems may serve as a constraint that
promotes the most adaptive development. In other species where auditory information may be
less important (i.e., because only a few danger signals need to be picked up and language is
not available), the visual system may mature at an earlier rate.
Thus, in our view we need a highly constrained system in order for the infant to develop
in an optimal manner. Without these constraints, the infant would be overwhelmed with both
information and choices and the probability of survival would be greatly diminished. Imag-
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ine, if all cells in a system or network were equally stimulated—then no selection would
occur—or the selection that did occur might be random in nature—putting the organism
at risk.
2.5. Selection
Selection pressures work at a number of different levels of the organism–environment sys-
tem. While evolutionary theory has focused primarily at the level of the species and individual,
we view selection pressures as also operating on the level of individual behaviors. In this way
variation and selection occur at all levels of the system depicted inFig. 1.
With advances in health and medicine in the industrialized world, selection pressures have
declined, enabling a wider range of performance levels to emerge and survive. We view this
phenomenon as a loosening of the environmental constraints. What this implies is that the
possible range of behaviors adequate for performing a developmental task has been expanded.
Selection pressures, are still present, but function in a more limited manner at the individual
level. Selection pressures at the level of individual behaviors are more strongly influenced by
the match between the organismic and environmental constraints. In the absence of a specific
task, selection pressures are substantially reduced—and a large number of behaviors will be
evident. For example, when a young infant is lying on her back, there is no explicit task for her
(she may obviously take on the task of learning how her limbs work with respect to gravity), in
this situation her arm and leg movements may show a high level of randomness. Yet, even in
this situation, periods of cyclical behavior may emerge as a function of organismic constraints,
as in the patterns of kicking and arm movements observed by Thelen and coworkers (Th len
& Smith, 1994).
While the reduction of selection pressures at the individual level may have enabled a wider
range of behaviors to emerge and survive, and a wider range of a particular behavior across
individuals to emerge and survive, this is not without consequences. For example, consider
the onset of walking. This behavior has been described as having a very wide range of onset,
anywhere from 8 to 17 months of age. We suggest that this wide range of onset is partially a
consequence of better health and nutrition reducing the selection pressures on individuals who
are at either extreme of the distribution.Fig. 2shows a normal distribution of potential walking
onsets. Selection pressures operate at both tails of the distribution. That is, the probability of
survival for infants who fail to walk or walk too soon is less than for those infants who fall
towards the center of the distribution. Infants with a late onset of walking may have greater
difficulties moving out of harms way or obtaining food or warmth. Likewise, infants who
walk very soon may lack the cognitive abilities to avoid dangerous situations. A nice example
of this is provided byAdolph (1997)who found a relationship between walking experience
and avoiding dangerous situations (specifically avoidance of walking down a slope that is too
steep). With increased walking experience infants were better at differentiating between the
risky and safe surfaces. This is one reason why placing infants in walkers is hazardous. The
greater locomotor ability of the infant in the walker may exceed their capacity to determine
where it is safe or not safe to locomote. Accident statistics reporting numerous injuries per year
to children under the age of 15 months placed in walkers support this explanation (American
Academy of Pediatrics, 2001).
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Fig. 2. The effects of environmental constraints on behavior. Curve represents distribution of a behavioral property
(i.e., on the onset of walking), arrows indicate shifts in optimal and high risk range as a function of changing
environmental constraints.
2.6. Freezing, freeing, and exploiting degrees of freedom in development and learning
Bernstein (1967)is credited with articulating an essential problem in the study of human
motor behavior, namely how do humans solve the problem of redundant degrees of freedom.
Bernstein (1967)noticed that the many possible (non-linear) interactions between different
components of the human body (e.g., joints, muscles, tendons, etc.) make separate regulation
of these components very unlikely. Specifically, any behavior, such as grasping an apple from
a tree, can be performed in an infinite number of ways. The degree of freedom problem raises
the question of how children and adults select among an infinite set of possibilities, the one
behavior to perform in a particular context.
One manner in which the complexity of the problem, or degrees of freedom, can be reduced
is by the formation of functional muscle synergies or coordinative structures (Turvey, 1990).
For instance, the action pattern that emerges when children attempt to grasp an object (task con-
straint) can be understood by the relation between organismic and environmental constraints.
The sources of organization of these coordinative structures can be found inNewell’s (1986)
‘constraints on action.’ For example,Van der Kamp et al. (1998)showed that the ratio between
object size (an environmental constraint) and hand size (an organismic constraint) determined
when children shifted from a one-handed to a two-handed grasping pattern. Thus, information
about the object size guides the grasping pattern and in this sense acts as a constraint that
determines the particular coordination pattern that will emerge.
In a more recent experiment,Van Hof et al. (2002)examined how the development of
crossing the midline is interwoven with the development of bimanual reaching. Previously,
it was held that the development of midline crossing is uniquely determined by maturation
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of the hemispheric specialization (Provine & Westerman, 1979) or the maturation of spinal
tracts (Morange & Bloch, 1996). Van Hof et al. observed infants longitudinally at 12, 18 and 26
weeks of age while reaching for two balls (3 and 8 cm in diameter) at three positions (ipsilateral,
midline, and contralateral). With age, the infants increasingly adapted the number of hands
used to the size of the object. The number of reaches crossing the body midline increased
with age. Furthermore, the majority of the midline crossings were part of two-handed reaches
for the large ball and occurred at or after onset of bimanual reaching. Together, this strongly
suggests that the development of crossing the body midline emerges in the context of bimanual
reaching. It is concluded that the need to grasp a large ball positioned contralaterally with two
hands induces midline crossing. Hence, the development of midline crossings is not exclusively
dependent on organismic constraints (e.g., the maturation of hemispheric connections), but on
their interaction with environmental constraints (e.g., object size).
Interestingly, researchers have often discussed the solution to the degrees of freedom prob-
lem in terms “learning.” Specifically, a number of researchers have described three stages of
“learning” with respect to Bernstein’s conception of degrees of freedom; an initial freezing of
degrees of freedom as the individual is beginning to acquire a new skill, a freeing up of the
degrees of freedom as greater skill is acquired, and an eventual exploiting of degrees of freedom
as expertise is acquired. Researchers (McDonald, van Emmerik, & Newell, 1989; Vereijken,
Whiting, & Beek, 1992) have also provided empirical evidence for three stages in “learning”
with respect to Bernstein’s degrees of freedom. For instance, when a subject “learns” to ski on
a ski-simulator (a platform attached to a spring that enables the platform to move side to side
in a ski-like fashion)Vereijken et al. (1992)found that at the beginning of practice, novices
tried to “freeze the system” by applying force to the platform at a biomechanically inefficient
moment. When using this strategy, one does not benefit from available elastic forces stored in
the stretched springs of the device. With experience, subjects “learned” to “free up the degrees
of freedom” and eventually “exploit” the characteristics of the apparatus, postponing their
force production until after the platform had passed the center of the apparatus and had begun
to slow down. With this strategy, subjects could make use of the elastic forces that gave them a
‘free ride’ back to the center of the apparatus and beyond, allowing them to reduce their active
muscle forces. In our view, this is clearly a non-developmental task, because learning not to
ski does not place one at greater risk for survival.
Development might also be described in terms of freezing, freeing, and exploiting degrees of
freedom. For example,Ledebt (2000)found changes in arm posture and movement of the arms
in relation to the step width of children who were just beginning to walk. During the first 10
weeks of independent walking the arms were held in an upright fixed posture (freezing of de-
grees of freedom). As the children’s step width and balance control improved there was a corres-
ponding increase in arm movement (freeing of degrees of freedom). Presumably, these arm pos-
tures aid to stabilize the body in an upright posture and according toLedebt (2000)enable the be-
ginning walkers to more efficiently propel themselves forward (exploiting degrees in freedom).
In our view, this process of freezing, freeing, and exploiting occurs throughout development.
There are a number of different levels at which freezing, freeing, and exploiting occurs in
the developing organism (seeFig. 3). At one level, organismic constraints may serve to ini-
tially freeze the system when the organism is at a particular behavioral level. These constraints
function so as not to overwhelm the child and to enhance the probability that the child will
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Fig. 3. A proposed model of Development and Learning.
acquire the necessary information to perform a particular task. Over time (with both experi-
ence and maturation) some of these constraints may loosen—providing a freeing of degrees of
freedom. Then at later stages the organism is likely to acquire the ability to exploit the degrees
of freedom in order to effectively explore and adapt to the environment. It is likely that organ-
ismic constraints that serve to freeze the degrees of freedom at this level have evolved to aid
the organism to develop in particular environments. However, while the constraints might be
viewed as primarily within the organism, they have evolved in response to environmental pres-
sures, and so should be viewed not as purely maturation (residing solely within the organism)
but should be viewed as capturing the organism–environment fit over evolutionary time. The
example, provided previously of the infants early perceptual abilities provides another case
where it appears as if organismic constraints, in this case an immature visual system, “freezes”
the system and enables the child to focus attention on relevant information in the environment.
At this level, the organismic constraints function in a general overall fashion. These constraints
serve to channel behavior in particular directions.
At a different level, we see these processes (freezing, freeing, exploiting) as occurring within
an organism’s performance on any given task—whether these be the evolutionary functional
tasks described above or whether they are some more arbitrary laboratory task. In this sense,
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similar processes are viewed as operating in both learning and development. What separate
these two phenomena is the task that is being confronted and how the various constraints interact
to lead the emergence of particular behaviors. We suggest that in the environment where the
organism has evolved, due to selection pressures, a relatively small number of optimal solutions
will have emerged for developmental tasks over the course of evolution. For non-developmental
tasks, depending on the task demands and how well they interact with organismic constraints,
few or many optimal solutions will emerge. Take as an example learning to ride to a uni-cycle.
This is a very difficult task, requiring excellent balance and coordination, and clearly not one
we have evolved to solve. A particular limited number of ways of solving this task emerge. Note
also that when an individual is learning this task they freeze certain parts of their body (such
as the arms in an extended position). As skill is acquired, the arms are freed up to perform
other tasks, such as juggling. For other tasks, such as writing with an implement, a wider
range of optimal solutions emerge. Specifically, a wide range of grip configurations involving
different configurations of the fingers and thumb can be found in the general population, yet
this variation does not appear to interfere with successful writing.
2.7. Concluding comments
Horowitz (2000)has discussed what she refers to as a “peculiar tendency” of developmen-
tal science to devalue data collected within a different theoretical tradition. In her view, new
theoretical accounts should be judged on how well they can accommodate existing data. This
ignores the fact that research methodology is always imbedded in particular theoretical tra-
ditions. Thus, a new theoretical perspective may at minimum require a reanalysis of existing
data, but it is not unreasonable to think that new data must be collected as well. Just as new
technology (such as a new form of telescope) may enable the collection of new kinds of data,
a different theoretical perspective may lead to a different vision about what types of data are
important. With respect to the TASC-based approach, this approach can be used to examine
existing datasets to the extent that information about variability is collected and the data were
collected as the child was performing a clearly defined task. To the extent that only mean data
has been collected (or reported) and the task is ill-defined then this data is not of much use.
We suggest it is time for a renewed focus on the functions of behavior, only this type of
approach will enable us to determine whether we should make a distinction between “learning”
and “development” or whether it is time for these concepts to be replaced entirely by the notions
of freezing, freeing, and exploiting the degrees of freedom of the system. By examining whether
the same processes can be applied to describe the emergence and change of behaviors that are
and not privileged we can begin to address this issue. But in order to address this question we
will need to collect new data, data that enables us to examine how variability in a behavior
changes over time and experience as a function of changing patterns of interacting constraints.
Notes
1. Throughout this paper, we will use the term “motor development” to refer to the academic
discipline that focuses on the investigation of the acquisition of motor skills in infancy
and childhood. We do this because this is the “domain” label that is nearly always asso-
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ciated with research in this discipline. At the same time we acknowledge that this label
assumes a particular theoretical perspective and its concomitant view of “development”
and “learning.”
2. We have added the emphasis. We certainly advocate that children with severe or even
moderate motor difficulties should be provided with help to improve their motor behavior.
However, the nature of this help and the “label” given to the child will vary greatly as a
function of whether the child is viewed as “normal” but “delayed” vs. “having a disorder.”
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